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1   Introduction
The human information processing apparatus, consisting of the nervous system and 
culminating in the brain, is widely hailed as a distinctive feature of man separating him 
from other animals. A large brain provides considerable utility in the form of a mental and 
behavioural flexibility that seems unattainable in its absence. This utility, however, does 
not come cheap, as brains are extraordinarily complicated structures with exceedingly  high 
operating costs. Given the considerable rewards associated with a large brain running 
efficiently, natural selection is thought to have optimised both structural and functional 
aspects of the brain’s information processing to a very high degree.
Over long periods of time, natural selection acting on genotypic variation begets biological 
adaptation in populations. The essence of the theory of natural selection has been described 
as “a statistical bias in the relative rates of survival of alternatives”, i.e., of genes and the 
individual organisms carrying those genes (Williams, 1966). The present thesis will 
concern itself with the evidence, consequences, and implications of neurobiological 
adaptation and optimisation of information processing in the human brain and that  of other 
species.
The evolutionary  push towards ever larger brains allowing for more complex behaviours 
inevitably collides with constraints set by the limited supply  of physical resources such as 
building materials, time, space, and metabolic energy (Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003). This 
perpetual conflict creates a need for efficient biological designs that optimise an 
organism’s fitness, reflecting a need to perform as little work and to employ  as few scarce 
resources as possible to achieve a given task. For the brain as a whole, the one clearly 
defined task is the most general one in biology: differential reproductive success. With 
respect to smaller units in the brain, their respective tasks range from the minimisation of 
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individual neuronal components without sacrificing adequate functionality to finding 
energetically efficient neural representations for biologically salient information.
Neuronal networks are seen at multiple levels of organisation to follow simple design rules 
linked to constraint  satisfaction and the allocation and minimisation of the use of physical 
resources. The present study will focus on neurobiological efficiency to do with the use of 
space and energy in particular. Identifying and eventually quantifying such optimisations 
of brain structure and function can yield strong evidence of their evolutionary  significance 
and guide further research into their role in human information processing.
Design principles relating to efficiency and parsimony in the structural and functional 
workings of the brain are found at times to be strikingly similar to those employed in man-
made electronic devices and networks. Minimisation of the neural wiring connecting brain 
regions, for example, faces challenges reminiscent of those encountered in the design of 
large-scale digital microchips, while limits to the brain’s energy supply have brought forth 
adaptations in its neural signalling network that bring to mind schemes employed in 
modern technological communications systems.
Like so many branches of science, neuroscience progressed at first largely as an exercise in 
description. The study  of biological optimisation in the brain offers one possible avenue 
forward, illuminating a host of general design principles directing the evolution of the 
nervous system and affecting its function at all levels of operation. Perhaps in time this 
approach can provide a source for a “generative grammar of the nervous 
system” (Cherniak, 1995), some general rules of efficient design that compactly 
characterise aspects of the nervous system’s anatomy and physiology. As the proverb goes, 
instead of examining only the trees this approach opens up the possibility of adopting a 
wider perspective and asking how the forest itself came to be.
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The main body of this study is divided into five parts. The introductory part gives a 
summary  of the premises and historical development of adaptationist thinking, addresses 
some criticisms levelled against  this school of thought, and introduces the application of 
mathematical optimisation theory to questions of biological adaptation. The second part 
describes possible avenues of neurobiological adaptation to do with the processing and 
transmission of information in the nervous system, and gives examples of analogies 
between neurobiological and man-made information systems.
The next two sections list evidence of biological optimisation to do with neural 
information processing. The first part concerns optimisations to do with the conservation 
of space in individual neuronal components and larger assemblies thereof, while the latter 
traces out the consequences of energetic limits on the functioning of the brain’s signalling 
network. The thesis ends with a summation of findings and a discussion of implications for 
future research.
3
2   On adaptation
Those organisms better adapted to the prevailing environment produce more offspring on 
average than do contemporary  organisms. Given heritability  of a trait, differential birth 
rates between organisms possessing a trait  that is beneficial and those without it  eventually 
allow said trait to grow more common within a population. For instance a prey animal with 
protective colouring will be more difficult to spot for a predator and hence more likely to 
survive and reproduce. Genetical heritability will eventually  spread such a trait  over an 
ever larger portion of the population. Evolutionary change occurs as a consequence of 
these changes in gene frequencies in a population.
For a given trait to be considered an adaptation it must meet three criteria:
1. the trait has evolved as a variation of an earlier form,
2. the trait is heritable,
3. the trait enhances the fitness or reproductive success of its bearer.
As a corollary of evolutionary adaptation the population attains an ever better fit with its 
current environment. Over time less useful phenotypes are weeded out in favour of those 
better attuned to the challenges posed by a given environment.
Wright (1932) formulated the concept of the fitness landscape, a mapping from an 
organism’s genotype or phenotype to its fitness. Natural selection is here portrayed as a 
force pushing a population of organisms up a proverbial hill, towards ever greater 
phenotypic fitness. While the fitness or adaptive landscape as a metaphor for the process of 
adaptation via natural selection has come under repeated criticism (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 
2007, ch. 1; Matthen & Ariew, 2002), some in the adaptationist camp have further 
developed this line of thought by arguing that natural selection acting on adaptive traits 
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will over time lead to those traits being optimal, that is, better than any  imaginable 
alternative, and even that such optimisation can be expressed mathematically (e.g. 
Maynard Smith, 1978; Alexander, 1996). This application of optimisation theory, better 
established in fields such as economics and engineering, to the study  of biological 
adaptation has proved to be a matter of some contention (Alexander, 2001).
Figure 1.  The fitness landscape and the force metaphor. A population is 
pushed “up” toward peak fitness by the “force” of selection, and in random 
directions by the “force” of genetic drift. (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2006, ch. 1)
Any change in environment conditions effectively  moves the goalposts of the adaptive 
game, prompting new adaptations to emerge or old ones to be transformed. Species and 
their adaptive fitness therefore lag by necessity  behind an environment ever in flux and its 
resultant adaptive landscape. All living things walk an evolutionary  tightrope between 
pressures to adapt and the biological cost of doing so. Evolutionary change is needed in 
order to adapt to a dynamic environment, whereas constancy and invariance preserve time-
tested solutions formed in the course of evolutionary history.
Even a given adaptation’s function does not remain constant. Exaptation or preadaptation 
is a situation where a trait  fortuitously takes on a function different from its original one, or 
where none previously existed (Gould & Vrba, 1982). The wings of alcids, a bird in the 
auk family, are one example: these birds can “fly” underwater as well as in the air 
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(Futuyma, 2009, p. 294). Earlier adaptations may also turn detrimental to the organism’s 
survival and reproduction. A trait which is more a hindrance than a help to the organism is 
known as a maladaptation (Crespi, 2000; Gangestad & Yeo, 1997). Natural selection 
operates incessantly, but the direction of selective pressures, i.e., which traits are favoured 
over others and why, depends on the environmental context.
There exist three broad categories of adaptive traits:
1. structural adaptations – those having to do with the physical features of an 
organism such as the shape or internal organisation of its body,
2. physiological adaptations – those pertaining to biochemical reactions in the 
organism and involving bodily functions such as hormone secretion or 
temperature regulation,
3. behavioural adaptations – those concerning what the organism does to 
survive, e.g., heritable chains of behaviour or a capacity to learn novel 
behavioural patterns.
As the present study is concerned with the evolution and biophysics of the central nervous 
system, it will focus mainly on adaptations falling into the first two categories described 
above. While the organisation of the nervous system has a definite effect on an organism’s 
behaviour, such behavioural adaptation is for the most part beyond the scope of this study.
2.1   Adaptationism
Adaptationism is a theory of evolutionary  change that asserts the central importance of 
selection as a factor in guiding an organism’s evolution. Adaptationists contend that natural 
selection acting on individuals within a population is the only substantial cause for the 
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evolution of any given trait, and hence the main goal of evolutionary biology is to 
understand the evolution of adaptations. 
Adaptationism as a general notion solidified only in the latter half of the 20th century, but 
its intellectual lineage can be traced back to the 19th century  and the formative years of 
evolutionary  thinking (see Mayr, 1983). The 1930s already saw a lively  debate concerning 
the influence of natural selection and of non-selective forces on the evolution of traits 
(Fisher, 1930; Wright, 1932). A highly influential adaptationist account was offered by 
Williams (1966), proposing that natural selection is the only factor that can account for a 
complex adaptive design’s coming into existence.
Godfrey-Smith (2001) identifies three strains of adaptationism. Empirical adaptationism 
holds that natural selection is the only  truly important factor in the evolution of traits, 
while other evolutionary influences and constraints are of little consequence over the long 
term. By and large it suffices to focus on selective forces when trying to explain or predict 
the outcome of an evolutionary process. Under this view, discrepancies between 
experimental data and the predictions of an optimality model should lead to the model 
being rejected in favour of a new one.
Explanatory  adaptationism, on the other hand, is the view that the “apparent design of 
organisms, and the relations of adaptedness between organisms and their environments, are 
the big questions  […] answering these questions is the core mission of evolutionary 
theory” (Godfrey-Smith, 2001). Natural selection is seen as the key to these questions, and 
is therefore of central importance in evolutionary thinking. In addition to being a claim 
about evolutionary science, explanatory adaptationism can also be seen as an untestable 
aesthetic claim more relevant to public discourse on evolutionary biology than science 
proper.
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The third variety of adaptationism has a more practical bent. Methodological 
adaptationism argues that  the track record of selective thinking in biology simply is 
impressive enough to warrant its continuation. The best way  to approach biological entities 
is “to look for features of adaptations and good design” (Godfrey-Smith, 2001). Adaptation 
is viewed simply as an organising concept for evolutionary research, and no claim is made 
about the actual role of selection in the realm of biology.
The three types of adaptationism identified here are thought to be logically  independent of 
each other, i.e., one does not in the strict  sense imply either of the two others. However this 
is not to say that they do not support each other. At a minimum it is useful to note that 
views regarding empirical and explanatory adaptationism need not go hand in hand.
Lewens (2002) offers a distinction between two kinds of adaptationism. Of these, 
hypothetical adaptationism is the stronger hypothesis. It outlines the debate over adaptation 
as an empirical question about the power of natural selection, stating the familiar thesis 
that selection is the only  important cause for most phenotypic traits. The heuristic mode, on 
the other hand, sees in adaptationism a recipe for generating hypotheses and organising 
research. Conceived in this way, “adaptationism has no truth value but should instead be 
judged by  its fruitfulness” (Lewens, 2002). This approach is essentially identical to the 
methodological view of adaptationism described above, and corresponds best with the 
point of view adopted in this study.
2.2   Critique from panglossianism
An influential critique of adaptationism was offered by Gould & Lewontin (1979), who 
describe the program of adaptationism as an attempt to “explain the existence and 
particular forms of nearly  any phenotypic trait as the result of natural selection” (Pigliucci 
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& Kaplan, 2000). In what is colloquially known as the “Spandrels paper”, adaptationists 
stand accused of adopting a panglossian paradigm1  of baseless optimism regarding the 
evolution of individual traits in living organisms. Gould & Lewontin (1979) argue that 
adaptationist thinking tends towards unscientific storytelling and ad-hoc explanations, and 
should therefore be rejected from serious scientific discourse.
As an architectural byproduct of mounting a dome on top of rounded arches, tapering 
triangular spaces called spandrels are formed at the intersection of two arches (see Fig. 2). 
The central dome of the basilica of San Marco in Venice, Italy, features four spandrels, 
each decorated with mosaic images. While a casual observer might jump to the conclusion 
that spandrels are purposefully designed as a place to display religious art, their existence 
is in fact mere architectural happenstance and not a consequence of purposeful 
architectural design.
Figure 2. An architectural spandrel. The area marked in gray shows an 
architectural spandrel between two arches. Image courtesy of the Wikimedia 
Foundation.
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1  The notion of panglossianism takes its name from Voltaire’s Candide, in which ridicule is heaped on a 
certain Dr. Pangloss for believing that “Things cannot be other than they are [...] everything is made for the 
best purpose.”
Gould & Lewontin (1979) wield spandrels2  as a metaphor to illustrate their critique of 
adaptationism. The authors argue that adaptationists are all too eager to identify individual 
traits in organisms and to assume that they are of necessity a result of natural selection (see 
also Reeve & Sherman, 1993). Standards for adopting and revising hypotheses of how and 
why a given adaptation came to be are portrayed as too lax to support  scientific 
explanations of trait evolution in living organisms.
All this amounts essentially to a warning against  “confusing function with 
adaptation” (Nielsen, 2009). Seeing a trait  put to a specific use should not be taken as 
evidence that it  has evolved for just that particular reason. For most any trait, the critics 
point out, a fitting story can be constructed of how it came into being, yet falsifying such 
hypotheses might well prove impossible in a scientific context. Gould & Lewontin (1979) 
also caution against viewing organisms as mere assemblages of individual traits, optimal or 
not, arguing that traits cannot and should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a 
complex and integrated whole.
The Spandrels paper issued a call for a shift towards more sophisticated adaptive analyses 
that take into account the developmental processes at work in the formation of traits. Gould 
& Lewontin (1979) offer a pluralistic approach to evolutionary biology, placing an 
emphasis on historical contingency  and the influence of constraints on adaptation. 
Selection is seen as constrained and often thwarted by a range of developmental factors, 
with evolutionary outcomes reflective of historical accident as much as adaptation 
(Godfrey-Smith & Wilkins, 2006). Lewontin (1983) concedes that an emphasis on 
adaptation was useful as an organising framework early  on in the development of 
biological theory, but regards it as impeding further progress.
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2 Although of little practical relevance to any discussion of adaptationism, it has since been pointed out that 
these architectural forms are in fact properly called pendentives not spandrels (Mark, 1996).
2.3   Constraints to adaptation
An organism’s living environment is but  one factor affecting the spectrum of possible 
adaptation. So-called developmental constraints bias the course of evolution, limiting the 
variability of phenotype production and thus of adaptability at large. Such constraints can 
be thought of as boundary conditions to evolutionary dynamics which “define the space of 
the permissible and probable transformations” that living systems can undergo (Schlosser, 
2007). Put simply, the way an organism has evolved in the past  biases its subsequent 
evolution, closing off some avenues and opening others.
Numerous ways have been offered of classifying kinds of developmental constraint. 
Schwenk (1995) groups these constraints into two classes. Class I constraints are those to 
do with evolutionary channelling, and can be further divided into functional and structural 
constraints. This type of constraint channels the patterns created and sorted by natural 
selection, setting boundaries for the path an evolutionary lineage takes through phenotypic 
space. Class II constraints consist of developmental and genetic constraints. The focus here 
is on underlying mechanisms that limit the generation of new phenotypes produced but 
have little effect on lineage-level phenotypic patterns. Class II constraints thus provide 
“proximate mechanisms and processes independent of natural selection” (Hall, 1999, p. 
100) that are further constrained by class I constraints and selective forces.
Gilbert (2010, pg. 744–746) describes three categories of evolutionary constraints:
1. physical constraints – those constraints that arise as a result of physical 
laws,
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2. morphogenetic constraints – construction rules concerning the ways in 
which an organism’s growth and shape can depart from their species-typical 
development,
3. phyletic constraints – historical restrictions based on the genetic background 
of an organism’s development.
Some phenotypes which are imaginable in principle are ruled out categorically  by physical 
constraints; such constraints are universal in the sense that they hold always and cut  off 
entire avenues of evolutionary  variation. For example wheeled appendages are impossible 
on a vertebrate, since blood cannot circulate to a rotating organ (Gilbert, 2010, pg. 744). 
Morphogenetic and phyletic constraints, on the other hand, apply only locally in the sense 
that their effect is dependent on historical context (Maynard Smith, Burian, Kauffman, 
Alberch, Campbell, Goodwin, Lande, Raup & Wolpert, 1985).
The present study will draw on knowledge of physical constraints to draw comparisons 
between actual brain functions and their theoretically optimal alternatives. Both universal 
and local constraints to adaptation are seen to have distinct effects on the organisation and 
function of the central nervous system.
2.4   Optimality and adaptation
Some evolutionary theorists have come to emphasize the power of natural selection acting 
on genetic variation to seek out optimal solutions to “problems” encountered by biological 
systems (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990; Alexander, 1996). Talk is of problems and 
solutions in the sense of genotypic and phenotypic variation leading eventually to 
differences in the survival rate and reproductive success of individual organisms. Over 
long periods of time this iterative process of refinement is hypothesised to produce 
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adaptations that are not just very good but  in fact optimal. Adaptive optimisation, in this 
view, is the quantitative expression of the evolutionary process.
Optimisation theory is a branch of mathematics that concerns itself with studying the 
extremal values of a function, that is, its minima and maxima. Its practical applications are 
often to do with finding the best alternative from a larger set by  minimising costs, 
maximizing gains, or by finding a workable compromise that satisfies some given 
constraints. Borrowing analytical tools from optimisation theory  is standard fare in various 
fields of study, but has met with some resistance in the biological sciences. Much criticism 
of adaptationist thought in general has hinged on the question of whether traits do in fact 
evolve towards a theoretical optimum (Gould & Lewontin, 1979), although there is no 
logically necessary  connection between optimality modelling and adaptationism 
(Potochnik, 2009).
An optimisation problem can be described mathematically as follows (Alexander, 1996): 
given a function f : A→R from some set A to the real numbers, find the element x0 such 
that
1. f(x0) ≤ f(x) for all x in A (the minimisation case), or
2. f(x0) ≥ f(x) for all x in A (the maximisation case).
This general framework can be applied to any number of real-world problems. Economy 
and efficiency being “universal characteristics of biological mechanisms” (Williams, 1966, 
pg. 41), the use of optimisation theory has made it possible for biologists to move “from 
merely describing patterns or mechanisms to being able to predict, from first principles, 
how organisms should be designed” (Sutherland, 2005).
Optimisation models relating to biological adaptation contain an assumption about three 
factors: relevant constraints, an optimisation criterion, and the assumption of heredity 
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(Maynard Smith, 1978; Sutherland, 2005). Constraints are typically to do with the set  of 
possible phenotypes on which selection can operate, describing the limits of what can 
evolve in the first place. In the context of this study the relevant constraints are more often 
related to the use of limited physical resources. The ideal optimisation criterion is an 
organism’s inclusive fitness3 (Vilarroya, 2002), but since the impact  of a single adaptation 
on fitness is often impossible to judge accurately it is generally sufficient to focus on a 
specific component of fitness instead, such as the rate of energy  intake while foraging (see 
Fig. 3). Heredity of adaptations is assumed as a precondition to natural selection.
Figure 3.  A simplified schematic illustrating optimal territory size for a 
foraging animal. The quantity of food available and the amount of food there is 
time to collect are plotted against territory size, demonstrating the effect of 
constraints on optimal behaviour. (Alexander, 1996)
(Maynard Smith, 1978) further specified that “in testing a model we are testing not the 
general proposition that nature optimises, but the specific hypotheses about constraints, 
optimisation criteria, and heredity  […] we test whether we have correctly identified the 
selective forces responsible for the trait in question.” This empirical view holds that 
optimisation methods are a helpful tool in the testing of adaptive hypotheses, and that  their 
usefulness does not rest on the assumption that  natural selection optimises always. 
14
3 Inclusive fitness is defined as the sum of an organism’s classical fitness,  which consists of its individual 
reproductive success, and its promotion of the reproduction and survival of genetically related individuals.
Building an optimality model that yields the observed phenotype as an optimal solution is 
seen as supporting the hypothesis of which factors are at play  in the evolution of a trait 
(Sutherland, 2005; Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990).
2.5   Adaptationism reformed
Since the criticisms raised against adaptationism, most poignantly by Gould & Lewontin 
(1979), the role played by constraints, tradeoffs, costs and benefits in trait  evolution has 
been a subject of frequent discussion. Constraints to adaptation have come to be seen as “a 
common and inescapable feature of living systems” (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2000), with 
accompanying implications for optimality  models. In light of the evident dangers of 
applying the methodology of adaptationism incorrectly, what possible explanation could 
there be for its enduring popularity, and has the critique against adaptationist thinking and 
optimality models been successfully addressed by theoretical advances?
A straightforward response has been to point out the heuristic value of adaptationist 
explanations (Lewens, 2002). The search for the function of biological structures has been 
“for centuries the basis for every advance in physiology” (Mayr, 1983), and its continued 
use is warranted on the basis of this distinguished track record. Whether this line of 
argument be seen as falling under the heading of methodological (Godfrey-Smith, 2001) or 
heuristic adaptationism (Lewens, 2002), its adherents can point to past results as evidence 
that the adaptationist approach is in fact a useful tool in studying evolutionary adaptation. 
Surely, the thinking goes, adaptive hypotheses could not have yielded such plentiful results 
if there were something amiss in the underlying theoretical construction.
Parker & Maynard Smith (1990), on the other hand, claim that the continued criticism of 
the use of optimality models in biology  is based on an erroneous understanding of the 
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purpose for which these models are built. The critique from panglossianism accuses the 
optimisation approach of clinging to the idea that living organisms are optimally  adapted 
and of seeking to find proof of this, i.e., of erroneously employing a “backwards” mode of 
reasoning (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2006, ch.7). However perfect adaptation is not assumed in 
optimality models at all, but rather the aim is “to understand specific examples of 
adaptation, in terms of the selective forces and the historical and developmental constraints 
operating” (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990).
Since optimality models include, in addition to an optimisation criterion and an assumption 
about the heredity  of traits, an additional assumption about any constraints relevant to a 
trait’s evolution, they  should not be held guilty  of espousing a panglossian worldview of 
unqualified optimality (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990). Crucially, taking into account 
constraints on adaptation is exactly  what precludes perfect adaptation. Where experimental 
data do not fit the predictions of an optimality model, the original model and its 
assumptions should be rejected and improved upon. Such an empirical approach sees 
adaptationism as a general methodology  guiding research rather than a specific, testable 
hypothesis. As such its utility is contingent on the outcome of tests run on optimality 
models and not something to be decided a priori on theoretical grounds (Orzack & Sober, 
1996). Even the failure of a carefully constructed model is instructive in that it tells us that 
additional factors are at work which are not captured by the model at hand.
A clarification of the relationship between the optimality approach and adaptationism in 
general was offered by Potochnik (2009) making a distinction between two different uses 
of optimality  models. The strong use amounts to a claim about representation: the model is 
thought to accurately represent the dynamics of selection, leaving no important 
evolutionary  factors unaccounted for. Such a definition links the strong use of optimality 
models with adaptationism and the criticism levelled against it.
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The weaker claim regarding optimality models is that such a model represents only  the role 
of natural selection in bringing about an evolutionary  outcome instead of representing all 
evolutionary  influences (Potochnik, 2009). Perceived in this manner, the legitimacy  of 
optimality models does not turn on that of adaptationism proper. More specifically, the 
critique raised by Gould & Lewontin (1979) has no bearing on such use of optimality 
models.
Kangaroo locomotion provides an illustrating example of the influence of developmental 
constraints on trait optimisation (Potochnik, 2009). Kangaroos travel by a series of leaps, 
meaning that changes are likely to evolve which improve their ability  to move in this 
particular way. Should bipedal running prove to be an even better mode of locomotion it 
would nonetheless be unlikely for kangaroos to evolve the ability to run, since initial 
changes in the transformation from leaping to running would tend to be significantly 
maladaptive (Maynard Smith et al., 1985). This example also brings to light a more general 
limitation of optimisation models: given a range of possible trait  values, these models can 
be used to find local optima, not global ones. Although a switch to bipedal running might 
be the best option in a global, panglossian sense, the phenotypic space of kangaroo trait 
evolution is constrained in such a way as to make it  highly unlikely  to occur on anything 
but the longest of time scales.
What emerges, then, is a “synthesis of constraints (spandrelism) and selection 
(panglossianism)” (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 2000), where selection works within phenotypic 
boundaries defined by prevailing constraints. Natural selection and its constraints are 
identified as the two main players on the evolutionary stage. While it is still more difficult 
to “test adaptive hypotheses rigorously than it is to make them up” (Pigliucci & Kaplan, 
2006, pg. 129), there are unequivocal limits on the extent of trait optimisation 
accomplished by natural selection. Since new adaptations always build on existing ones, 
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biological design is about compromising and satisficing (Brownlee, 2007; Simon, 1956) as 
much as optimising.
2.6   A note on teleology
A notable feature of evolutionary biology in general and adaptationist theories in particular 
is the recurrent use of terms such as “function” and “design”. References abound to 
adaptations as having evolved to perform a certain function, to satisfy  a need, or to have 
been designed with a given purpose in mind. On a literal interpretation these terms imply 
the presence of final causes in nature, an agency akin to that  ascribed to human actions. 
Such parlance is more commonly called teleological, i.e., goal-oriented, and is generally 
avoided in contemporary science because of its historical association with pre-Darwinian 
notions of conscious design by a supernatural creator.
A linguistic dilemma thus appears at the very core of the program of evolutionary biology. 
Put simply, the language employed in adaptive explanations is frequently at odds with the 
process of evolutionary causation. To talk of natural selection as an optimising process, 
and of adaptations as solving particular problems that organisms face, is to give the 
impression of evolution working towards a definite goal. Teleological language is 
controversial in a scientific context precisely  because it  seems to presuppose either reverse 
causation or design for a purpose.
Mayr (2004) addresses the issue of goal-directed language by pointing out that biology 
studies questions of a different type from those of other natural sciences. In the physical 
sciences, only questions of “what?” and “how?” are held to be valid. The life sciences, on 
the other hand, also ask the question of “why?”. Examples are questions such as why  an 
organ is built in a certain way, or why an organism behaves the way it does.
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Although evolutionary  phenomena are subject to the same universal laws as all other 
physical phenomena, any explanation of a product of evolution must by necessity take the 
form of a historical narrative reconstructing its evolutionary past (see Mayr, 1983). Since 
adaptations do indeed have a purpose in the evolutionary sense, namely  the tasks for which 
they  are adaptations, it is the very concept of an adaptation which underwrites the 
continuing use of teleological language in evolutionary biology (Allen & Bekoff, 1995). In 
this view, the use of goal-oriented terms in adaptationist explanations is more linguistic 
artefact than ontological commitment, and as such presents no additional theoretical 
complications.
Vilarroya (2002) distinguishes between two types of optimality. The evolutionary kind 
occurs as a result of natural selection favouring the trait which maximises the organism’s 
fitness, whereas in the case of reverse-engineering optimality a mechanism is designed to 
comply with its intended function. Given a problem to solve, an engineer moves from 
problem to solution, whereas evolution acts blindly and stumbles upon the solution by 
chance and brute force. To conflate these two strategies is to open the door to 
misunderstandings regarding cause and effect.
In biological systems, adaptation and optimisation occur as a result of natural selection 
acting on the results of random processes‚ not those of conscious design. Teleological 
notions are a distinctive feature of the life sciences and frequently helpful as explanatory 
shorthand, yet one should be mindful of maintaining translatability  with strictly  naturalistic 
definitions.
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3   Avenues for brain optimisation
The principle of parsimony is frequently invoked as a useful guide in the study  of 
evolutionary  biology (Stewart, 1993), and was already noted early on in the study of the 
nervous system (see Ramon y Cajal, 1995). Other things being equal, natural selection is 
thought to seek out the least resource-intensive alternative to carry  out  a given task. 
Physical resources such as energy, building materials, time and space can be thought of as 
mediums of exchange that enable the quantitative comparison of competing solutions. 
These resources are conserved where possible, leading to increasingly  efficient biological 
designs in terms of implementation and maintenance costs.
Raising the question of whether there are physical limits that constrain the human brain’s 
processing power and its growth, Hofman (2001) offers a division of such factors into two 
categories with two subcategories each:
1. energetic limits to do with blood flow:
(a) thermal limits – as the brain is actively cooled not  simply by  heat 
conduction from the surface of the head but also by blood, a 
limiting factor to brain growth is how fast heat can be removed 
from the brain by the flow of blood,
(b) metabolic limits – the high metabolic cost of the brain requires 
more blood to be transported to a larger brain;
2. neural processing limits to with the processing of information:
(a) design limits – the neural architecture needed to process ever 
growing amounts of information,
(b) operational limits – the accumulation of signal processing delays 
in a larger brain.
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Hofman (2001) concludes that there is little room for incremental improvement available 
within the limits of the existing Bauplan or construction plan of the human brain. Given 
the constraints described above and the apparent continued growth of brains over 
evolutionary  time, there comes a point corresponding to a brain volume two or three times 
that of modern man where the brain reaches its maximum information processing capacity. 
Once the brain has grown to the point where the bulk of its mass is in the form of neural 
connections, any further increases in size will be detrimental due to increased signalling 
delays and declining neuronal integration. Any further evolutionary  advances in 
intelligence would then need to take place outside the nervous system, perhaps in the 
technological realm with its radically different selection mechanisms and forces.
Humans are seen in this view as being at the cusp of a hard limit to the information-
processing capacity of neuron-based systems (Hofman, 2001). It must be noted, however, 
that even if these conclusions should prove to be correct, growing brains two or three times 
larger than exist today would likely take millions of years even under the most optimistic 
of assumptions.
The present study will concern itself with describing adaptive optimisations in the brain to 
do mainly with four physical resources:
1. space, i.e., the volume taken up by the neural machinery,
2. building materials consumed in the construction and maintenance of said 
machinery,
3. metabolic energy, consumed mainly by neural signalling in the form of 
action potentials,
4. the time expended on neural signalling and computation.
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Taking into the account the limited space available for this thesis, we will focus in 
particular on optimisations to do with the use of space and the consumption of metabolic 
energy. As all four physical resources mentioned above are oftentimes intimately 
intertwined in the brain, optimisation of one can and frequently  does lead to more 
efficiency also in the use of others. For example, construction of a brain that is smaller in 
volume will of necessity also require less in the way of biological building blocks. In other 
cases the need for preservation of one resource is found to stand in direct opposition to 
parsimony in the use of another.
3.1   Spatial optimisation
Reducing the size of an organ is generally advantageous as long as adequate function is 
preserved. A smaller brain, for instance, consumes less energy  than would a larger one. 
Shorter distances between brain regions also make for more rapid signalling between 
different parts of the brain, allowing for quicker responses to external stimuli and more 
complex information processing within a shorter period of time.
Given the benefits of parsimony in building a neuronal network, natural selection is 
expected to optimise the brain’s structure to allow for efficient performance in as small a 
volume as possible without sacrificing function. Space-efficient  design should thus be 
visible at all levels of operations, from single neurons to entire brain areas and the neural 
wiring connecting them.
There are three ways to reduce the size of a nervous system (Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003):
1. reducing the number of neurons required for adequate function;
2. reducing the average size of neurons;
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3. optimising the layout of neurons so as to reduce the lengths of their 
interconnections.
Since knowledge of the number of neurons required for adequate function of the human 
information-processing apparatus remains out of reach of contemporary neuroscience, the 
present chapter will concern itself only with the latter two of these three options.
3.1.1   Miniaturisation
Axons and dendrites connect neurons to each other, relaying signals between nerve cells. 
They  account for the majority  of an individual neuron’s volume (Goldberg, 2003), hence 
any minimisation of neuronal volume would be most visible here. Reducing the size of 
these components allows neurons to be packed closer together, leading to smaller overall 
brain volume and a decrease in signalling delays within the brain.
Two constraints limit the reduction of axon diameter. Firstly, the molecular machinery 
required to propagate action potentials, including, e.g., the cell membrane, ion channels 
and pumps, and a supporting cytoskeleton, can only fit into an axon with a diameter of 
0.06 µm or larger (Faisal, White & Laughlin, 2005). This sets a hard limit on the diameter 
of axons of the type in existence today.
In unmyelinated axons, random fluctuations in the axon membrane potential, also known 
as ion channel noise, sets the limit  at a larger diameter of around 0.08—0.1 µm (Faisal et 
al., 2005). In axons with a smaller diameter, spontaneous electrical activity precludes the 
precise timing of action potential generation. As the ratio between signal and noise grows 
smaller, reliable transmission of information between different parts of the brain becomes 
ever harder, impairing the brain’s normal signalling functions.
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Myelination, encasing axons in sheets of electrically insulating plasma membrane, offers 
another avenue for the miniaturisation of single neurons. While the conduction velocity  of 
action potentials increases with axon diameter, myelination increases the velocity of action 
potential propagation by a factor of ten or more compared to unmyelinated fibres of the 
same diameter (Hartline & Colman, 2007). As a consequence, the speed of information 
processing in the nervous system is increased and reaction times decreased. A similar 
improvement in conduction velocity  achieved through increasing axon diameter would 
entail an axon on the order of 100 times larger.
Random ion channel noise is ever present in the nervous system on account of the inherent 
unreliability  of its biological components, especially those to do with channel gating in a 
neuron’s dendrites and axons (Sarpeshkar, 1998). The nervous system can, however, also 
benefit from noise due to the phenomenon of stochastic resonance, a general phenomenon 
with applications not just in biology but also in physics, chemistry and engineering. 
Stochastic resonance describes a situation where “the mere addition of random noise to the 
dynamics improves a system’s sensitivity  to discriminate weak information-carrying 
signals” (Hänggi, 2002). 
Figure 4.  Typical curve of output performance as a function of input noise 
magnitude in the presence of stochastic resonance. Performance of the system 
peaks at an intermediate noise level. (McDonnell & Abbot, 2009)
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A high level of random noise in the nervous system will deteriorate detection of signals, 
yet there exists a lower, optimal level of noise which, correlated suitably  with a given 
signal, can aid the chance of detecting sub-threshold signals that would otherwise go 
unnoticed (Traynelis & Jaramillo, 1998). The nervous system will presumably  have 
adapted to take advantage of the increased signal-to-noise ratio provided by stochastic 
resonance.
3.1.2   Large-scale minimisation
In addition to miniaturisation of single neurons, space can be utilised more efficiently  in 
the brain by  optimising the layout of neurons so that minimal wiring is needed to connect 
them. The relative frequencies of local (short-range) and global (long-range) connections 
in particular are a central factor in wiring optimisation, with a greater degree of shorter 
connections allowing the neural network to be packed into a smaller volume.
The six-layer cerebral cortex is a distinguishing feature of mammalian brains ranging 
across species from the pygmy shrew all the way to elephants, maintaining a constant 
thickness of just a few millimeters across species extending over five to six orders of 
magnitude (Zhang & Sejnowski, 2000). While the size and division of cortical laminae 
vary greatly between different brain areas and species, mammalian cortex is consistently 
organised into six main layers (Briggs, 2009). Given that neurons in the human cortex have 
on average 29 800 synapses for a grand total of some 3.6*1014 synapses in all of cortex 
(Roth & Dicke, 2005), finding the one optimal layout for all synaptic connections is 
practically impossible on any time scale.
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Figure 5.  A simple three-component placement optimisation problem. Shown 
are two alternative placements of three elements in fixed positions. Placement 
scheme (b) requires a shorter overall connection length than scheme (a). 
(Cherniak, 1994)
According to the wiring optimisation principle, among functionally equivalent 
arrangements of neurons, that is, those arrangements that  preserve a given adequate 
function of the nervous system, “the one having connected neurons as close as possible is 
most evolutionarily fit and, therefore, most likely  to be selected” (Chklovskii & Koulakov, 
2004; Raj & Chen, 2011). The biological cost  of wiring neurons arises not only from the 
volume taken up by wiring, but also from factors such as metabolic requirements, 
signalling delays, and attenuation. This has lead to the idea of optimal component 
placement in the nervous system, the notion that neural modules of different sizes should 
be arranged so that any possible rearrangement of these modules would lead to an increase 
in the total length of wire (Kaiser, 2007; see Fig. 5).
An analogous problem of component-placement optimisation can be found in the design of 
very large-scale integrated (VLSI) microchips (Cherniak, 1995), and has been shown to be 
part of the class of NP-hard (non-deterministic polynomial-time hard) mathematical 
problems. It is conjectured that there exists no solution to this class of problem which can 
be computed in polynomial time, hence finding an optimal solution to such a problem is 
prohibitively expensive in a computational sense. In practical applications, NP-hard 
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problems are typically solved non-optimally using “quick and dirty” heuristic mechanisms 
instead of exhausting the entire space of admissible solutions.
Finding very good wiring optimisation in the brain raises questions regarding the 
mechanisms by  which such optimisation is accomplished. A simple brute-force search of 
even a 50-component problem would require timescales longer than the age of the 
universe4, even at  unrealistic speeds of optimisation (Cherniak, 1994). Given the difficulty 
of finding an optimal or near-optimal solution to problems of this class, evidence of a high 
degree of optimisation in the layout of components in the brain would strongly implicate 
the importance of wiring cost as an organising factor in the brain’s evolution.
The central nervous system can be modelled as a giant biological signalling system in 
which neurons convey information in the form of electrical impulses between different 
areas of the brain. Such a system can readily  be represented as a biological network, an 
abstract representation of a biological system that suppresses needless detail yet captures 
its essential characteristics (Alon, 2003). Neurons are here represented as nodes in a 
network, with their connecting dendrites and axons corresponding to the edges between 
nodes.
Network analyses based on mathematical graph theory have been widely deployed in fields 
such as physics and sociology in recent decades. The study of networks is based on the 
premise that the behaviour of complex systems – be they composed of molecules, neurons 
or people – is driven by the interactions among their constituent elements (Bullmore & 
Sporns, 2009). Details of individual interactions between elements of a network are 
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4  An exhaustive search of a system with N elements requires searching through N! alternative layouts, 
therefore an indiscriminate search of all realisable layouts quickly becomes computationally intractable as the 
system grows in complexity. The computational requirements can in some cases be alleviated by employing 
suitable heuristics to constrict the search space.
reduced away in favour of a larger picture capturing the essential attributes of the system 
as a whole.
The lack of a complete connection matrix of the human brain, known as the human 
connectome5, presents a formidable challenge to any large-scale analysis of human brain 
networks. Despite a recent  proliferation of neuroscientific databases (Bassett & Gazzaniga, 
2011; Sporns, Tononi & Kötter, 2005) coupled with new computational methods under the 
umbrella term of neuroinformatics (Wood, 2011), a picture of the connectome as a whole 
still remains out of reach for neuroscience. Even partial datasets can, however, provide 
glimpses of discoveries to be made once a more complete picture of the human 
connectome emerges.
Small-world networks are a type of random graph characterised by  sparse global 
connectivity and short average distance between any two nodes, first described in a 
seminal paper by Watts & Strogatz (1998). This type of network treads the middle ground 
between the two traditional models of a regular lattice (neighbourhood-connected) network 
and a completely  random one in terms of local clustering and average path length between 
nodes (see Fig. 6).
Small-world networks are often contrasted with another type of network topology known 
as the Erdős–Rényi random graph (Erdős & Rényi, 1960), which consists of a network of 
N nodes so that every  pair of nodes is connected with a probability  of p. Given small 
values of p the network is made up of small ensembles without interconnections between 
them, whereas a larger value of p will produce a continuous network with connections of 
random length. Such a network has a short average path length with little clustering.
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5 The connectome is a deliberate analogy to the concept of the genome, an organism’s full complement of 
genetic information.  The Human Connectome Project is working to construct a complete map of structural 
and functional neural connections in the human brain.
Figure 6.  Simplified examples of possible brain network topologies. A regular 
lattice topology minimises wiring by connecting each node to its two nearest 
spatial neighbours, sacrificing global efficiency of information processing. A 
random topology maximises integrative processing of information by 
connecting nodes at random, yet results in a very high wiring cost owing to the 
large number of long-range connections. Complex topologies, among them 
small-world networks, sit between the two extremes, featuring lattice-like local 
clusters connected by long-distance shortcuts. Such models combine low 
wiring costs with efficient global transmission of information.  (Bullmore & 
Sporns, 2012)
A regular lattice network, on the other hand, features minimal connection costs but a very 
long average path length. However in a small-world network neighbours are better 
connected than in a comparable Erdős–Rényi random network, whereas the average path 
length remains almost as low as in random networks. A network with small-world 
characteristics will generally be strongly  clustered at the local level, with fairly sparse 
global connectivity. Meanwhile the average distance between any two nodes, measured in 
terms of the average number of steps along the shortest path between all possible pairs of 
nodes in the network, is short. More specifically, in such a network the shortest path L 
between two nodes chosen at random grows in proportion to the logarithm of the number 
of nodes N in the network as L ≈ log (N).
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Small-world functional networks come endowed with a number of beneficial features such 
as resilience against the failure of individual nodes, minimal wiring costs, and efficient 
signalling between distant  parts of the network (Achard & Bullmore, 2007). Given that 
these are all desirable attributes of a signalling network striving for high efficiency of 
information transfer at low connection costs, small-world features would be expected to 
have arisen at multiple levels of organisation in the brain, both in functional and in 
anatomical networks.
3.2   Energetic limitations
Sending action potentials along neuronal wires is metabolically expensive, accounting for 
20% of the energy expenditure of an adult human body  and up to 60% for infants (Harris 
& Attwell, 2012; Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003). The expensive-tissue hypothesis (Aiello-
Wheeler, 1995; Herculano-Houzel, 2012) suggests that the metabolic energy requirements 
of a large brain are such that natural selection has had to offset  them by a corresponding 
reduction of the gut, “the only one of the metabolically expensive organs in the human 
body that is markedly  small in relation to body size” (Aiello & Wheeler, 1995). 
Notwithstanding a rise in the organism’s basal metabolic rate, a large brain cannot be 
maintained without reducing the gut by shifting to a higher-quality diet.
Up to 80% of the human brain’s energy consumption is related to neural signalling 
processes (Raichle & Mintun, 2006). Of this portion, another 80% is expended on driving 
action potentials along axons and creating postsynaptic potentials (Attwell & Laughlin, 
2001). The remainder is used, among other things, on maintaining resting potentials and 
the vegetative functions of neurons and glia cells. The brain as a whole operates under an 
extreme paucity of energy reserves, with an interruption in blood circulation to the neck of 
only 7 s leading to loss of consciousness (Ames, 2000).
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While the potential bandwidth of the human cortex has been estimated to be as high as a 
terabit per second (Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003), energetic constraints dictate that this 
capacity is never achieved in practice. Energy supply to the human brain sets a limit on the 
permissible rate of neural signalling of less than 1% of neurons sending action potentials 
concurrently  in the cortical regions of the human brain (Lennie, 2003). Furthermore, the 
majority  of energy consumption is related to intrinsic activity in the brain, with perhaps 
only 0,5–1% of the total energy  burden associated with momentary  demands of the 
environment (Raichle, 2006). The brain can thus be seen to consume energy  constantly  at 
rates close to its maximum capacity.
A limited energy supply brings about a multitude of adaptive pressures in the brain. 
Minimising the amount of neural wiring reduces energy consumption as signalling 
distances between different areas of the brain are shortened, but miniaturisation of neural 
components eventually  raises problems about noise in signalling (Faisal, 2005). A 
reduction in size is thus beneficial only as long as adequate function of the signalling 
network is maintained in the form of a satisfactory signal-to-noise ratio6. Neural 
representations, too, are affected, and must make do with a limited amount of costly action 
potentials.
3.2.1   Efficient neural representation
In addition to enforcing metabolic efficiency, the high energetic cost of transmitting nerve 
impulses also implies an efficiency of neural representation. Efficient representation of the 
incoming signal was already described as a task of the visual system more than fifty years 
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6  The buildup of noise in sequential stages of neural computation has even been suggested to set a 
fundamental limit on the logical depth to which brains can compute (von Neumann, 1958, pg. 82).
ago, prompting the suggestion that information theory could provide a quantitative link 
between the statistical information contained in environmental scenes and neural 
representations thereof. Barlow (1961) put forth the efficient  coding hypothesis, proposing 
that instead of being equally  capable of processing any inputs, the brain and especially its 
sensory  systems should be expected to exploit the statistical dependencies contained in 
natural stimuli.
Redundancy is a central concept of information theory, being defined as the remainder of 
the number of bits used in the transmission of a message and the bits of actual information 
contained therein. Less formally it can be described as those bits wasted in the 
representation and transmission of a given piece of information. As natural scenes are 
known to contain considerably  redundant information, with perhaps less than half the 
entropy  of random noise (Chandler & Field, 2007), the nervous system is expected to take 
advantage of these redundancies in encoding the sensory environment by repressing 
irrelevant data and compressing any information that is deemed worthy  of further 
processing. High redundancy thus allows the sensory system to reduce the problem space 
of how to represent natural scenes by focussing its efforts on those things which it is likely 
to encounter in the world. In essence the sensory system is expected to be biased, at  both 
evolutionary, developmental, and behavioural timescales, to efficiently handle the types of 
inputs it will most probably come across (Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001).
The ability to make distinctions is one of the fundamental capacities which underlie 
cognition. In an unbounded environment, natural selection would be expected to maximise 
the combinatorial or, in the case of neural codes, representational capacity  of the brain, i.e., 
its ability to encode distinct items of information.
One of the fundamental questions about neural coding of representations is whether items 
of information are coded for by  the activity of single neurons or by global activity  patterns 
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of the whole population of nerve cells. There are now both theoretical reasons and 
experimental evidence suggesting that the brain has adopted a compromise between these 
two extremes, with the degree of sparseness still largely a matter for future research 
(Graham & Field, 2006).
representational 
capacity
metabolic cost fault tolerance
local code very low very low none
sparse code high low high
dense code very high very high very high
Table 1.  Properties of fractional coding schemes. (Adapted from Földiák, 
2002)
In a neuron population of N binary neurons with Np neurons firing on average, the coding 
scheme with p=0.5 is known to have the largest  possible representational capacity  of 2N 
distinct items (Levy & Baxter, 1996). Yet such a dense distributed coding scheme, also 
known as a holographic code, is not only  difficult to implement but also requires 
maintaining high average firing rates, which is prohibitively expensive given the brain’s 
limited energy supply. Given that the permissible level of signalling traffic in the brain is in 
fact remarkably low (Lennie, 2003), maximisation of the brain’s representational capacity 
is constrained by the availability of energy. What arises is an evolutionary pressure to 
represent information in an energy-efficient manner, with as few nerve impulses as 
possible7.
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7 As a historical aside,  the branch of mathematics known as information theory (Shannon, 1948) was born of 
an analogous need to quantify, compress, and transmit electrical signals efficiently during the design of early 
telecommunications networks in the first part of the 20th century.
Local codes occupy the other extreme of fractional coding schemes (Földiák, 2002). Here 
each item to be represented is coded for by a single neuron while all others stay silent, and 
no one neuron takes part in the representation of more than one item8. Such a scheme has 
the benefit of being simple to implement and easy to decode. Its representational capacity, 
however, is very low, since a network of N binary  neurons can code for only N distinct 
items. A prohibitively large neural network would be required to meet the representational 
needs of anything but  the most simple of organisms. Extremely local neural codes are also 
highly  susceptible to damage in that the demise of even a single neuron would lead to the 
loss of whatever representation that neuron coded for.
Sparse coding of neural representations offers a favourable compromise between the two 
extremes of local codes and distributed ones by  combining aspects of metabolic and 
representational efficiency (Graham & Field, 2006). A sparse coding scheme activates a 
modest fraction of neurons per item to be encoded, growing the representational capacity 
of the system exponentially from that of local codes while at the same time being 
comparatively  simple to implement. Additionally, sparse encoding of stimuli necessitates 
the elimination of statistical redundancy from neural representations. A relatively low 
average rate of neural activity allows for energy-efficient coding within the limits set by 
energetic constraints, and sparse codes would thus be expect to feature widely in the brain.
Sparseness of a neural representation is typically characterised in one of two ways 
(Graham & Field, 2006; Willmore & Tolhurst, 2001). Measures of a single neuron’s 
activity over time are referred to as temporal or lifetime sparseness. Since a population of 
neurons could appear to exhibit temporal sparseness even with all of them firing together, 
this parameter alone provides little information regarding an entire neuron population’s 
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8 Extremely localised coding schemes are occasionally the object of neuroscientific ridicule since they seem 
to imply the existence of so-called “grandmother cells”,  neurons responding only to a highly specific 
stimulus such as the image of one’s grandmother (Gross, 2002).
behaviour. Population sparseness, on the other hand, is calculated as an average of 
individual activity  patterns across the set of neurons, giving a measure of average 
sparseness in the unit. One form of sparseness does not by necessity imply the other.
Recording simultaneous activity  from a large population of neurons presents a formidable 
experimental challenge to any investigation of neural coding. Novel techniques such as 
optical and multiple electrode recording may eventually  yield experimental data on the 
density  of neural coding (Bhalla, 2008), but recording the activity  of larger units of 
neurons is largely impractical as of yet. At present much data regarding the sparseness of 
neural representations comes from single-cell recordings in the brain’s sensory systems in 
particular (Rolls & Treves, 2011; Olshausen & Field, 2005), where input signals are 
relatively easy  to control. Of note is also the fact that extreme sparseness in neural firing 
rates represents a quandary for experimental procedures in that such activity might easily 
be overlooked by an investigator hoping to elicit a response in a very small set of neurons.9
A striking feature of physiological recordings from sensory cortical areas is the difficulty 
of creating stimuli that reliably activate nerve cells. While this applies even at lower levels 
of sensory processing such as in the primary  visual cortex, the problem becomes even 
more severe at higher levels of processing where neurons respond ever more selectively to 
inputs. Although the efficient coding hypothesis was originally proposed some fifty years 
ago, experimental technologies have only  recently advanced to the point where it  is 
practical to truly begin testing its predictions.
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9 The apparent sparsity of neural activity in the brain has even brought forth speculation of a “dark matter 
problem” in neuroscience analogous to the famous conundrum in astrophysics that much of the matter in the 
universe is undetectable or “dark” (Shoham, O’Connor & Segev, 2006).
4   Efficient use of space in the brain
The parsimonious utilisation of space is a fundamental factor in the biological efficiency of 
the central nervous system. Adaptations to do with saving space can be seen at multiple 
levels of neuroanatomy, from components of individual nerve cells and the neural wiring 
connecting them to global architectural designs combining low costs of implementation 
with efficient information transfer.
A number of experimental results are presented pertaining to the utilisation of space in the 
brain and limits to its minimisation by way of biological adaptation. We start  at the level of 
individual neurons and the effects of their miniaturisation on noise and neural signalling, 
continuing on to a discussion of results surrounding the principle of wiring minimisation. 
Lastly we examine research concerning the presence of small-world features in brain 
anatomical and functional networks.
4.1   Local minimisation
Neurons form the basic building blocks of the human information processing apparatus, 
playing a central part in both neural computation and signalling. Given their sheer number, 
estimated at 100–200 billion in the human brain (Noctor, Martínez–Cerdeño & Kriegstein, 
2007), the physical structure of individual neurons is thought to be a perennial object of 
optimisation by  natural selection so as to minimise the size, transmission times, weight, 
and energy consumption of the brain.
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4.1.1   Axon diameter
An action potential, the basic unit of signalling in cell-to-cell communication in the brain, 
is transmitted by the concerted actions of a large number of voltage-gated ion channels 
embedded in a nerve cell’s plasma membrane. Noise is an inescapable property  of brains 
operating with frequently unreliable molecular components at  the nanometer scale (Faisal, 
Selen & Wolpert, 2008). Reduction of a neuron’s membrane area leads to a concomitant 
reduction in the number of ion channels carrying the electrical current, resulting in a 
decline in the signal-to-noise ratio which eventually impairs the performance of neural 
signalling (Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003). Wiring minimisation via the miniaturisation of 
individual neuronal components thus reaches a limit at the point  where reliable 
communications break down.
While individual axons are microscopic in diameter, they  may extend to macroscopic 
lengths and hence account for the majority of a neuron’s volume. Adding up the cross-
sectional areas of the components of molecular machinery needed to generate action 
potentials gives a theoretical minimum axon diameter of around 0.06 µm (Faisal et al., 
2005). However, computational simulations show that axons with a diameter below about 
0.1 µm become practically inoperable because single, randomly opening Na channels will 
generate action potentials spontaneously and disrupt communication between neurons. As 
axons grow thinner, neural signalling therefore grows noisier and its capacity to carry 
information decreases (Faisal & Laughlin, 2007). Axons with a diameter of 0.15–0.3 µm 
already display  a significant amount of spontaneous activity, and below this critical 
diameter of 0.1 µm the frequency of spontaneous action potentials increases exponentially 
to the point where the axon’s refractory period sets a limit on the firing rate and 
transmission of information becomes impossible (Faisal et al., 2005).
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Figure 7.  Distribution of axon diameter in a range of species and tissues. 
The finest axons reach the limiting diameter of 0.1 µm (dotted line); the few 
exceptions are developing fibers of 0.08 µm diameter (arrowhead). (Faisal 
et al., 2005)
A review of high-resolution electron-micrograph studies covering several taxa (Faisal et 
al., 2005) consistently found a minimum axon diameter of 0.1 µm, with rare exceptions 
down to 0.08 µm. The distributions of axon diameter (see Fig. 7) were found to be skewed 
towards the critical limit of 0.1 µm, with a typical peak around 0.3–0.5 µm, and to fall off 
sharply to zero at or just below 0.1 µm. This result is compatible with an evolutionary 
pressure to minimise axon diameter and suggests that axon diameter is indeed limited at 
the lower end by increasing ion channel noise.
4.1.2   Myelination
Besides affecting the signal-to-noise ratio of neural communications, axon width is also 
proportional to conduction velocity  (Ikeda & Oka, 2012), advocating an evolutionary 
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pressure to maximise rather than minimise axon diameter. A biological solution to this 
apparent contradiction that has arisen independently  in several taxa (Hartline & Colman, 
2007) is that of a myelin sheath encasing axons in an electrically insulating plasma 
membrane, allowing for more rapid communications over longer distances without 
sacrificing wiring minimisation by increasing axon diameter. Myelination also improves 
the energy efficiency of an axon as it decreases the area of depolarisation during and the 
amount of repolarisation needed after the action potential has passed (Neishabouri & 
Faisal, 2011).
Figure 8.  The fraction of myelinated axons increases with brain diameter. 
Each symbol represents pooled values from one animal. (Adapted from Wang, 
Shultz, Burish, Harrison, Hof, Towns, Wagers & Wyatt, 2008)
Since organisms are likely selected for fast  cross-brain signalling, and nerve impulses will 
on average travel for longer distances in larger brains, myelination is expected to be more 
prevalent in larger brains. Wang et al. (2008) report findings in line with this hypothesis, 
with the ratio of myelinated to non-myelinated axons increasing with brain diameter in 
species ranging from the shrew and rat to the cat and macaque (see Fig. 8). As a corollary 
the authors find a corresponding reduction in metabolic cost per action potential created in 
larger brains, due largely  to the higher proportion of myelinated axons. A similar result 
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concerning the comparative energetic efficiency  of myelinated over unmyelinated axons 
was described by Neishabouri & Faisal (2011).
Evolutionary  pressures for minimisation seem to push axon diameter close to its minimum 
practical width in order to keep down the size of the brain. Myelination helps to increase 
the conduction velocity of action potentials in larger brains, accommodating faster 
signalling while still keeping axon diameter close to its practical minimum.
Roth & Dicke (2005) ask the question of how it is that  human brains are able to facilitate 
what is generally  taken to be an exceptional mental and behavioural capacity. Either in 
absolute or relative terms humans do not have the largest brain, the largest cortex nor even 
the largest prefrontal cortex among different animal species. While the human brain does 
have the largest number of cortical neurons, elephants and whales are not far behind yet 
seem to display less intelligence as defined here.
Where the human brain does differ from those of other animals is in its capacity to process 
information (Roth & Dicke, 2005), and here axonal conduction velocity plays a central 
role. Myelinated cortical fibres are relatively  thick in primates compared to elephants and 
cetaceans, corresponding to a higher conduction velocity. The authors speculate that 
coupled with a more tightly packed cortex, i.e., shorter average distances between neurons, 
this allows for a greater overall information processing capacity and more intelligent 
behaviour. Additionally, structural and functional specialisations in the human prefrontal 
cortex are likely to have played an important part in the evolution of human intelligence.
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4.2   Noise and stochastic resonance
The probabilistic nature of voltage-gated ion channels, random cell membrane fluctuations, 
and synaptic processes such as the quantal release of neurotransmitters into the synaptic 
cleft create electrical channel noise in neural networks (White, Rubinstein & Kay, 2000). 
As described above, the evolutionary  pressure for miniaturisation of neural components 
makes this noise all the more prevalent. While random noise has the potential to disrupt 
neuronal communications by impairing the reliability of neuronal responses to given 
stimuli, noise can in fact play a productive role in the nervous system.
When a neuron is presented with an input that falls below its threshold for firing, it does 
not produce an action potential and consequently does not transmit any information. If, on 
the other hand, there is too much random noise coming in from presynaptic neurons, the 
neuron will fire at a high rate in response to the noise and any outgoing information will be 
buried under the noise. However the presence of a certain non-zero amount of noise can 
help  trigger the firing of action potentials in response to sub-threshold inputs, thus 
facilitating the detection of so-called weak signals which would remain undetected in the 
absence of noise (Kourkoulas-Chondrorizos, 2012; see Fig. 4).
This counterintuitive phenomenon is known as stochastic resonance, and can be described 
more generally  as a situation where “the behaviour of a non-linear system to a weak, 
periodic stimulus is optimised by the presence of an optimal level of noise” (Traynelis & 
Jaramillo, 1998). The essential ingredients for stochastic resonance consist  of two inputs – 
a coherent signal and random noise – and an output which is a function of these inputs. 
Stochastic resonance has been described in a number of physical, biological and technical 
systems in recent decades (Gammaitoni, Hänggi, Jung & Marchesoni, 2009). With regard 
to noise in the nervous system, stochastic resonance offers a tantalising hint of non-
deterministic processes at work in the brain (McDonnell & Abbot, 2009).
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Figure 9.  Mutual information as a function of noise amplitude in a population 
of 100 spiking Izhikevich neurons. Mutual information is defined as the amount 
of information that is common between input and output signal. The 
characteristic signature of stochastic resonance is clearly visible (see also Fig. 
4). (Adapated from Kourkoulas-Chondrorizos, 2012)
Experimental results provide an abundance of results implicating stochastic resonance in a 
functional role in neural communications (see McDonnell & Ward, 2011). Phasic neurons 
in the auditory brain stem have been shown to respond to inputs in the presence of noise 
which are transparent to them in the absence of it  (Gai, Doiron, Kotak & Rinzel, 2009). 
Rudolph & Dextexhe (2001) describe significantly increased responsiveness to periodic 
sub-threshold signals in reconstructed neocortical pyramidal neurons simulated according 
to measured activity  in cat parietal cortex. Kourkoulas-Chondrorizos (2012) found noise of 
a certain amplitude to produce a distinct peak in the mutual information of 100 model 
Izhikevich10 neurons, mirroring predictions assuming the presence of stochastic resonance 
(see Fig. 9).
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10  The Izhikevich neuron model is a simple, semi-empirical model of cortical neurons combining the 
biological plausibility of the Hodgkin–Huxley model with the computational efficiency of integrate-and-fire 
neurons (Izhikevich, 2003). 
Despite the natural occurrence of noise in the central nervous system, the precise 
identification of that noise and its incorporation into theories of stochastic resonance 
remains an unresolved experimental problem (Moss, Ward & Sannita, 2004). While much 
of the evidence for stochastic resonance at work in the brain is still indirect at this point, 
i.e., the result of applying both signal and noise externally to neural systems or simulations 
thereof, it  has been argued that “it  would be more surprising if the brain did not exploit 
randomness provided by noise – via stochastic resonance or otherwise – than if it did 
not” (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009).
Stochastic resonance can be observed in a neural system when a computational goal is 
better achieved in the presence of noise, that is, random biological fluctuations, than in its 
absence (McDonnell & Ward, 2011). In the present  context the phenomenon of stochastic 
resonance can be seen as a useful and biologically efficient adaptive compromise between 
pressures to minimise wiring, to maintain reliable neural communications, and to improve 
detection of biologically relevant weak signals11.
4.3   Global minimisation
The wiring economy principle, known also as the wiring optimisation principle, postulates 
that “for a given wiring diagram, neurons are arranged in an animal to minimize the wiring 
cost” (Chen, Hall & Chklovskii, 2006). The evolutionary  costs flowing from excess wiring 
are attributed to factors such as the volume taken up by wiring, signalling delays, and 
attenuation, as well as metabolic expenditures associated with signal propagation.
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11 Additionally,  noise is thought to play a part in the development of the brain, increasing with maturation and 
correlating positively with stable behaviour once it reaches an optimal level (McIntosh, Kovacevic, Lippe, 
Garrett, Grady & Jirsa, 2010).
Science at present  has yet to assemble the human connectome, a complete description of 
the structural connectivity of the human nervous system (Sporns et al., 2005), precluding 
whole-brain analysis of wiring cost optimisation in humans. The entire nervous system of 
some simpler organisms or subdivisions thereof have, however, been mapped exhaustively 
and provide suitable material for the study of wiring economy (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009).
4.3.1   Caenorhabditis elegans
Caenorhabditis elegans is a free-living nematode (roundworm) around 1 mm length. It has 
been used extensively as a model organism because of its simple structure and 
transparency (Leung, Williams, Benedetto, Au, Helmcke, Aschner & Meyer, 2008). C. 
elegans is among the simplest organisms with a nervous system, consisting of only  302 
neurons in the hermaphrodite (Kosinski & Zaremba, 2007), and therefore provided a self-
evident choice for early investigations of component-placement optimisation in the 
nervous system.
Figure 10.  Distribution of neural wiring costs of all 39,916,800 possible 
layouts of ganglia in C. elegans. The least and most costly layouts are rarest, 
with the actual layout corresponding to the smallest wire cost.  (Cherniak, 
1995)
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Optimal ganglion-level placement in C. elegans was reported by Cherniak, (1995)12 from a 
set of 11! or 39,916,800 possible layouts, an exceptionally  high level of conformance to 
the rule of save wire. The worst possible or “pessimal” layout would correspond to a 
wiring cost of about four times as much connecting fibre as the actual and optimal layout 
(see Fig. 10). A brute force search of the relevant  placements for all 302 neurons was 
deemed impractical, as the number of possible permutations increases exponentially  with 
the number of components.
Young & Scannell (1996) offer a critique of the findings reported by Cherniak (1995), 
pointing out  several departures in actual brain connectivity from what is predicted by 
wiring minimisation. The authors raise the possibility  that a simple adjacency rule, a 
hypothetical tendency of neural components to innervate their neighbours, could account 
for observed regularities of neuroanatomical connectivity. Minimal connectivity, it is 
claimed, does not imply  component-placement optimisation: “the optimally small length of 
tunnelling between London Underground stations [...] does not imply  that the geographical 
positions of Piccadilly  Circus and Leicester Square have been optimised to minimise the 
amount of tunnel” (Young & Scannell, 1996).
Cherniak (1996) counters that the wiring optimisation found for ganglia in C. elegans can 
in fact not be achieved by “a computationally  cheap procedure such as the adjacency  rule 
[...] when there are too many interconnections for all connected components to be 
contiguous,” nevermind for network architectures typically far more complex than in the 
nematode. While the layout of the C. elegans nervous system does depart  strongly from a 
random pattern in favour of an adjacency rule, such a rule alone does not suffice to 
produce the actual layout.
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12 The paper also included one of the very first complete, single-image depictions of an entire nervous system 
at synapse-level detail.
The hypothesis that neuronal placement minimises wiring costs as specified by  synaptic 
connectivity was pursued by Chen et  al. (2006). For 279 non-pharyngeal neurons in C. 
elegans most were found to be located close to their optimal position, with mean 
deviations of less than 10% from the optimal layout using different wire-cost models. The 
authors suggest that wiring optimisation plays an important role in guiding the organisation 
of the network and, as outliers neurons shared distinct  structural characteristics, can even 
be used to infer neuron function.
More support for the wiring economy of C. elegans is offered by Pérez-Escudero & de la 
Polavieja (2007). The authors dissect the nematode nervous system into smaller sub-
networks to test for the existence of smaller, optimised networks within the system at large. 
The C. elegans nervous system was found to contain a subnetwork comprising 84% of 
neurons wired almost optimally, with a very low position error of 5.4%. A smaller sub-
network of sensory and motor neurons containing 15% of all connections can alone predict 
the main features of encephalisation and the clustering of neurons into ganglia.
Building on the results described above, Pérez-Escudero, Rivera-Alba & de la Polavieja 
(2009) submit that a simple probabilistic rule can explain the deviations from optimality 
found in the nervous system of C. elegans. All neurons in the nematode with large 
deviations from their optimal position have a low number of connections with other 
neurons; in other words, the largest deviations are to be found in those components with 
the least impact on an indirect measure of fitness derived from the wiring cost. A 
computational simulation of wiring costs incorporating this consideration shows only 
0.033% of all possible permutations producing a smaller wiring cost than the actual layout 
in C. elegans (see Fig. 11).
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Figure 11.  Histogram of wiring costs resulting from random deviations of 
somatic positions from their optima in C. elegans. The arrow indicates the cost 
of the actual configuration, with only 0.033% of configurations resulting in a 
lower wiring cost. (Pérez-Escudero et al., 2009)
4.3.2   Separation of white and gray matter
Segregation of the brain into white and gray matter is a ubiquitous feature of vertebrate 
anatomy. Gray  matter is composed mainly  of neural somata, synapses, and short-range 
connections consisting mainly of dendrites and unmyelinated axons. White matter contains 
long-range connections which implement global communications in the brain, and is 
largely made up  of long, myelinated axons. As this segregation of components is not a 
necessary  condition for achieving the observed connectivity, it  is assumed that  this 
particular mode of organisation carries with it some evolutionary advantage.
Wen & Chklovskii (2005) studied the reasons for the segregation of gray and white matter 
under the assumption that maximal brain functionality  requires high interconnectivity  of 
components and minimal conduction delays in the transmission of neural signals. As high 
connectivity adds to conduction delays because of increased volume and larger distances 
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between neurons, the two requirements contradict each other, and any  compromise 
between the two must accommodate both their respective needs.
Figure 12.  Regimes in which a homogenous design (HD) or a perforated 
design (PD) separating white and gray matter are optimal. Calculated in terms 
of the global axon diameter D, local wire diameter d, total number of neurons 
N, and the number of local connections per neuron n. Values for the brain of 
different species are shown. (Adapted from Wen & Chklovskii, 2005)
Borrowing analytical (non-numerical) tools from theoretical physics, Wen & Chklovskii 
(2005) were able to show that conduction delays limit the size of a highly connected neural 
network. In order to avoid signalling delays on the order of seconds, the brain must 
combine sparse global connectivity with a high degree of local connections. Conduction 
delays were shown to grow longer in a homogenous design intermixing local and global 
connections compared to the actual, segregated design (see Fig. 12).
In a related study, Chklovskii et al. (2002) asked the question of what fraction of volume 
should be taken up by axons and dendrites in optimally wired gray matter. The authors 
derive an equation describing how this wire fraction depends on four factors: conduction 
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delay in axons, signal attenuation in dendrites, the number of synapses, and a layout 
parameter specifying the length of wire used for a given arrangement of neural matter. 
Varying the wire fraction while keeping all but one of the variables fixed, each of these 
quantities is found to reach an advantageous extremum when the wire fraction has a value 
of 3/5. Measurements from three cortical regions in mouse give a wire fraction not 
significantly different from 3/5 (see Fig. 13), leading the authors to conclude that cortical 
circuits are organised close to optimal efficiency in the sense of minimising conduction 
delays, cable attenuation, and total wiring while at the same maximising the number of 
synaptic connections.
Figure 13.  Wire fraction in mouse neocortex. Wiring is found to occupy a 
portion close to its optimum of 3/5 of gray matter. (Chklovskii, Schikorski & 
Stevens, 2002)
The anatomical segregation between local and global connections embodied in the 
separation of gray and white matter also enables investigation of the scaling relationship 
between the two. Larger brains by  definition require longer connections to allow for 
communication between distant areas of the brain, resulting in disproportionately more 
white matter as brain grow in size. Zhang & Sejnowski (2000) report a power law with an 
exponent of 4/3 relating the volume of white and gray  matter in species spanning five to 
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six orders of magnitude. Herculano-Houzel, Mota, Wong & Kaas (2010) reach a similar 
result, noting that white matter mass scales in primate brains as the power function of the 
number of neurons in gray matter to an exponent of 1.197 ± 0.091. Larger brains therefore 
seem to be burdened with the cost  of supporting an outsize communications infrastructure 
in white matter, which grows in size significantly  faster than does the amount of gray 
matter.
4.3.3   Layout of brain areas
Optimisation of neural component placement affects the organisation of the nervous 
system at multiple levels of hierarchy, and has been the object  of extensive study  in recent 
years (see Bullmore & Sporns, 2012; Cherniak, 2012). Cortical areas are brain modules 
defined by their structural architecture and functional specialisation. In the cerebral cortex, 
the resource constraint of wiring minimisation actualised through optimisation of the 
layout of cortical areas has been lightheartedly described as a kind of “plate tectonics of 
the cortex” (Cherniak, 1994).
Cherniak, Mokhtarzada, Rodriguez-Esteban & Changizi (2004) analysed the global 
optimisation in the layout of such mammalian cerebral areas where adequate information 
on connection data is available. In order to avoid the experimental and computational 
difficulties of measuring actual wire length in the cortex, the authors derive a simpler 
adjacency cost and a size law that predicts optimisation patterns in sub-networks of cortical 
areas. For 17 continuous macaque visual cortex areas and 14 cat cortex modules spanning 
40 Brodmann areas of visual, auditory, and somatosensory regions, the authors find the 
actual layouts to correspond to an optimisation of wiring cost in the top 10-7 of all possible 
layouts. Optimality of the layout was found to improve exponentially with sample size, 
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with larger subsets of cortical areas performing progressively better in their relative 
ranking for adjacency rule optimisation (see Fig. 14).
Figure 14.  Size law for 17 macaque visual cortical areas and 14 metamodules 
in cat cortex. Subsets of cortical areas are compared with 109 alternative 
layouts for wiring optimality (conformance to an adjacency rule). The actual 
layout curve (diamonds) shows smaller subsets ranking toward the middle of 
their group of alternative layouts, with optimality-ranking improving as subset 
size increases. For comparison, each scrambled layout curve (circles) shows 
the corresponding analysis for layouts of the areas with their adjacencies 
randomly shuffled. E.g., for macaque, fewer than one in 106 of all alternative 
layouts conform to the adjacency rule better than the actual layout of the 
complete set of 17 cortical areas. (Cherniak et al., 2004)
A study  of the layout optimisation of 11 macaque prefrontal cortical areas was carried out 
by Klyachko & Stevens (2003). The authors compared the total axon volume 
corresponding to many  thousands of alternative arrangements of areas belonging to the 
orbital-medial network of the prefrontal cortex to the volume corresponding to the actual 
layout. As in the case of C. elegans ganglia described above (Cherniak, 1995), this 
experimental setup yields 11! or some 39.9 million potential arrangements. The actual 
layout of macaque cortical areas was found to be wired optimally, minimising the axonal 
volume required to satisfy existing connections. An additional test was performed by 
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perturbing the locations of cortical regions in order to verify that the wiring optimisation in 
evidence was not merely the consequence of an adjacency rule specifying a preference for 
connections between neighbouring areas. The actual arrangement of cortical areas was 
found to be optimal for perturbations of inter-areal distances of up to 15%.
4.4  The small world of the brain
Evidence of small-world architecture in functional networks of the primate brain was first 
described by Stephan, Hilgetag, Burns, O’Neill, Young & Kötter (2000). The authors 
collated published data on the spread of neural activity  in the macaque cerebral cortex in 
vivo after induced disinhibition. Three independent methods of computational analysis all 
confirmed that the network of interactions within the cerebral cortex is not homogenous 
but highly organised into clusters. Cortical areas were found to form three main clusters 
combining high intrinsic and low extrinsic interactivity: a somatomotor cluster, a visual 
cluster, and an orbito-insular-temporal cluster. These clusters were also judged to be 
broadly consistent with known anatomical divisions in the cortex.
A companion paper by Hilgetag, Burns, O’Neill, Scannell & Young (2000) reported similar 
results for the anatomical connectivity of macaque and cat cortex. Two different 
computational methods were used to analyse compilations of cortico-cortical connection 
data in the two species. Macaque and cat  cortices were found to display the 
characteristically small-world features of being organised into densely intraconnected 
clusters composed of anatomically identifiable member areas, with average local 
connectivity within the clusters nearly  twice as high as the level of interconnectedness 
between cortical areas. Average path lengths calculated from the connectivity data were on 
the same order of size as the short characteristic path lengths typical of randomly 
redistributed data. In the primate visual system, the results confirmed a sub-division into 
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three main groups of primary, ventral, and dorsal areas similar to those reported by 
Stephan et al. (2000).
Figure 15.  Path length and clustering coefficient13  for a large-scale 
connection matrix of the macaque visual cortex. The cortical matrix has a path 
length similar to a random network, but a much larger clustering coefficient. 
(Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser & Hilgetag, 2004)
The results of both companion papers presented above were confirmed and extended in a 
later study by Sporns & Zwi (2004), who also note the striking tendency of cortical 
connectivity to display small-world characteristics across multiple spatial scales ranging 
from large-scale inter-regional pathways to local circuits. Densely connected and 
functionally related modules are recombined at different scales to produce larger functional 
and anatomical units in a manner reminiscent  of other types of biological systems such as 
metabolic and protein networks.
Kaiser & Hilgetag (2004) investigated the development of cortical networks by studying 
the perennial favourites, cat and macaque cortex, additionally  employing a simulation of 
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13 The clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a network tend to group together.
neural growth using a simple spatial growth model. Networks resulting from the simulation 
were compared to actual brain anatomical networks for measures relating to the degree of 
clustering and the average shortest path between nodes. For both cortical as well as 
simulated networks the total wiring length was found to sit between those corresponding to 
minimal and random wiring, indicating a general preference for short-length connections. 
Comparing the average shortest path for different wiring setups, longer average path 
lengths were found for minimal wiring than for the actual networks (Kaiser & Hilgetag, 
2004). The authors conclude that the existence of long-range connections in these networks 
increases total wiring length above its theoretical minimum, but leads also to a shorter 
average path length. The conservation of shorter paths, that is, a lower number of 
interconnections in cortical pathways, might thus be a more important constraint in the 
development of brain networks than achieving minimal total wire length.
Achard & Bullmore (2007) investigated the efficiency  and biological cost of functional 
networks in the human brain using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data 
from two groups of healthy adults. Efficiency was specified in terms of the minimum path 
length between different brain regions, with costs defined as the total number of edges or 
connections in the network. The functional connectivity of 90 cortical and sub-cortical 
regions was estimated using wavelet correction analysis of fMRI time series and then 
thresholded to produce a set of undirected graphs representing the brain functional network 
of each participant in the study. The topology of all functional networks was found to be 
between a random and a lattice graph in terms of local and global efficiency as a function 
of their implementation costs, a characteristically  small-world behaviour. Additionally, the 
performance of small-world networks was found to decrease with age, with measures of 
efficiency declining markedly in a control group of older subjects. The authors conclude 
that functional networks in the human brain have small-world topological properties that 
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would be expected on the hypothesis of selection for high efficiency of parallel 
transmission of information at low cost.
Furthermore, the efficiency of both brain structural and functional organisation has been 
linked to individual differences in human intelligence as measured by the intelligence 
quotient (IQ). Li, Liu, Li, Qin, Li, Yu & Jiang (2009) calculated topological small-world 
properties of the brain anatomical network of 79 adult human subjects divided into general 
and high intelligence groups based on IQ test scores. The authors found significant 
correlation between network properties and intelligence, with higher IQ scores correlating 
positively with both a shorter average path length in the anatomical network and higher 
global efficiency defined in terms of the parallelism of information transfer in the network.
Similar results were reported by  van den Heuvel, Stam, Kahn & Hulshoff Pol (2009), who 
studied the correlation between the topology of brain functional networks and IQ scores in 
19 subjects. Topological properties of the functional brain networks were calculated by 
applying graph analysis to fMRI time series data recorded from the subjects. Again, the 
authors found a strong positive correlation between the level of global communication 
efficiency and intellectual performance in the form of a strongly negative association 
between characteristic path length and IQ.
Interestingly, the number of edges (connections between neurons) was found to correlate 
significantly with intelligence for brain anatomical networks (Li et al., 2009) but not for 
functional networks (van den Heuvel et  al., 2009). While the brain’s structural and 
functional networks are certainly aligned to some degree, these results present one 
practical example of how the exact relationship between the two remains elusive.
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5   Energy efficiency in the brain
Neural signalling is metabolically  expensive to the point of being restricted by the energy 
supply of the brain. Nerve impulses are processed and transmitted by  individual neurons in 
a manner adapted to this scarcity. Even the extent of neural signalling in the brain as a 
whole is highly constricted by energetic margins, leaving large swathes of the human 
cortex silent for the better part of time.
The representation of information in neuronal networks, too, demonstrates energy-efficient 
behaviour on multiple fronts. Owing to the considerable energetic demands of creating and 
relaying action potentials, neural representations are composed economically utilising a 
minimum of costly spikes.
5.1   Signal processing in neurons
Neural networks have evolved in an environment that is inherently noisy, and neurons 
themselves are relatively unreliable units of computation. Noise is the fundamental enemy 
of communications engineers (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009), whose goal is to design 
systems to transmit  signals from one place to another efficiently and with as few errors as 
possible. Signal processing in the brain thus faces an environment that is hostile to its 
fundamental purpose.
Analogue computational systems operate with continuous values of physical variables in 
continuous time, while digital system use discrete values and discrete time. Owing to their 
physical makeup, analogue systems are prone to accumulate noise during sequential stages 
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of computation, leading to offset errors as computations grow more complex (Sarpeshkar, 
1998). Digital systems, on the other hand, restore the value of the signal to one of two 
attractor states – 0 and 1 – at each stage of computation. Although this error correction 
ensures the robustness even of complex digital systems, it  comes at the price of additional 
energy expenditure required after every step of computation. At low precision, digital 
systems are comparatively less energy-efficient  as much of their ubiquitous error 
correction could be sacrificed without substantially  affecting the accuracy  of computations 
(Mandal, 2009).
As sensory data are by definition analog, it is beneficial to have at least an analogue front-
end to capture their richness. The rest of signal processing in the brain, however, cannot be 
entirely  analogue because noise will accumulate during successive processing stages and 
eventually degrade the reliability of the computation (Sarpeshkar & O’Halloran, 2002).
Nerve impulses typically  travel along dendrites as graded potentials, i.e., analogue signals. 
These signals are summed up in the cell body or soma of the neuron and, once a triggering 
threshold is exceeded, an action potential is generated that propagates along the axon. 
Since the action potential is generated on an “all-or-nothing” basis, meaning that its 
amplitude is independent of the amount of current that produced it, it is in essence a digital 
signal. Nerve cells can thus be seen as combining beneficial features of the analogue and 
digital regimes to produce an energy-efficient hybrid model of computation using 
comparatively unreliable components (Sarpeshkar & O’Halloran, 2002).
A neuron essentially functions as an A/D or analog-to-digital converter succeeded by its 
opposite number, a D/A or digital-to-analog converter (Sarpeshkar, 1998). Such an A/D/A 
device takes as its input a continuous quantity  in the form of an analogue signal, then 
converts it  into a discrete representation in digital form, and lastly  performs the reverse 
operation to produce a fresh analogue signal. Carrying signals in analogue form curtails 
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energy consumption, keeping down communication costs, while the digitisation phase 
provides error correction to allow for the construction of complex computational 
sequences.
Besides minimisation of wiring and increased delivery speeds, myelinated axons also work 
to conserve energy in neuronal activities. In axons covered in a myelin sheath, a nerve 
impulse’s passing results in a smaller ionic imbalance in need of restoration, resulting in a 
several-hundred fold improvement in metabolic energy efficiency  of neural signalling 
traffic (Hartline & Colman, 2007).
5.2   Energetic limits to neural signalling
Electrophysiological recordings from human cortex show that neurons are intensely 
activated when engaged in appropriate tasks. The metabolic cost  of a single neural spike is 
high, which severely limits the amount of neurons that  can be substantially active at any 
one time. Signalling-related expenditures account for a large fraction of the brain’s energy 
consumption, which favours the use of energy-efficient neural codes and wiring patterns.
The cost of spiking neurons arises mainly from restoring the ionic imbalances caused by 
action potentials and from the release and re-uptake of synaptic neurotransmitters. Attwell 
& Laughlin (2001) analysed the energy expenditure of different neural components on 
excitatory signalling in the grey matter of rodent brain, concluding that the adenosine 
triphosphate (ATP)14  use triggered by each action potential is on the order of 1.6 times 
greater than usage per second on the resting potential. The total rate of energy consumption 
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14 ATP is a multifunctional coenzyme often referred to as the molecular unit of currency used by cells.
thus rises quickly with spike rate, advocating the use of distributed neural codes to improve 
the energy efficiency of neural representations15 (see Fig. 16).
Figure 16.  Energy usage in encoding 1 of 100 different conditions as a 
function of the number of cells simultaneously active. Distributed coding can 
be seen to improve energy efficiency. (Attwell & Laughlin, 2001)
Scaling up  from figures given for rat cortical neurons by Attwell & Laughlin (2001), 
Lennie (2003) calculated an estimate of the energy consumption of pyramidal neurons in 
the human cortex. An individual spike in the human cortex was found to be 3.3 times as 
costly  as in rat  cortex, while maintaining resting potentials is 2.6 times more expensive. 
Using these numbers, neocortex is estimated to account for 44% of the human brain’s 
overall consumption of some 20% of all energy consumed by the adult human body.
Given the high energetic cost of neural spiking, only a very small fraction of neurons can 
be active at any one time. Lennie (2003) gives an estimate of a sustainable spike rate in 
human cortex of only 0.16 spikes/s/neuron. An average spike rate of 1.8 spikes/s/neuron 
would expend more energy than is consumed by the whole brain, while a spike rate of 
around 13 spikes/s/neuron would use more energy than is consumed by the whole body. 
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15 The unreliable nature of neural signalling is another factor weighing in on the side of distributed coding: 
given unpredictable wires,  single-channel transmission of information is prone to miscommunication and 
data loss (Sarpeshkar, 1998).
Even on more conservative estimates of the energy expended on signalling, an average 
spike rate in human cortex of 3.1 spikes/s/neuron would exceed the amount of energy 
consumed by the entire brain. Hence with even a few percent of neurons highly active over 
all of cortex the metabolic burden associated with neural signalling would grow 
unsustainable. Even with lower average rates of neural activity, there is a need for 
machinery to allocate resources efficiently across cortical regions according to demand.
Figure 17.  Energy potentially consumed by human cortex as a function of 
average sustained activity in all neurons, expressed as a fraction of whole 
brain consumption. The solid curve is based on best estimates of energy supply 
and costs, while the dotted line corresponds to conservative estimates of energy 
consumption. (Lennie, 2003)
Attwell & Gibb (2005) studied the effect  of energetic limits on the brain’s “clock speed”, 
that is, its speed of information processing. Rapid processing of information requires both 
swift processing of sub-threshold presynaptic potentials and the propagation of action 
potentials at high frequencies to postsynaptic neurons, which together account for the 
majority  of energy expended on signalling. Diversion of energy  to the processing of 
synaptic potentials would bring on a decrease in the rate of action potential generation and 
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vice versa. For information processing to occur significantly faster, heavy investments 
would be needed to, e.g., increase the density  of capillaries in the brain. Yet capillaries are 
already on average only  60 µm apart in the gray matter of the human brain, and a denser 
capillary network would significantly  reduce the space available for neurons in the absence 
of a corresponding increase in brain size. The energy  available for neural signalling 
therefore seems to limit its timescale of operation to the current millisecond range.
An intriguing connection can also be made between the energetic limits of cortex and the 
traditional view of attention as an adaptation to the brain’s limited capacity  for processing 
information. The scarcity of permissible aggregate neural activity does not imply that only 
a few tasks can be undertaken concurrently, but it does provide “a natural metric for 
characterising aggregate task difficulty: how much cortex is active” (Lennie, 2003).
Since local neural activity varies strongly  with task while the general rate of energy 
consumption in the brain is essentially constant (Raichle, 2006), mechanisms are necessary 
for the efficient allocation of energy. Local changes in cerebral hemodynamics, exploited 
in functional magnetic resonance imaging, are a clear sign of this machinery in action 
(Lennie, 2003).
The fact that the brain consumes energy at a relatively constant rate, varying as little as 
0.5–1% according to environmental demands suggests that its operations are mainly 
intrinsic in nature (Raichle, 2006). Maintaining, interpreting, and predicting environmental 
information and its for demands for behavioural responses may indeed be the most costly 
of tasks performed by the brain. This could account, for example, for the surprisingly low 
number of only 10% of synapses in visual cortex carrying incoming information from the 
outside world: perhaps innate activity  is simply more central to the brain’s modus 
operandi. While the exact reasons for the nearly unchanging level of neural activity  in the 
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brain remain unknown, one thing we can surmise from such a pattern of energy 
consumption is that the brain is never at rest.
5.3   Sparse neural codes
When action potentials are costly, neural signalling must adapt to convey messages in as 
few spikes as possible without losing information. Energy-efficient sparse coding of neural 
representations involves the compression of information into a code with less redundancy, 
employing fewer action potentials and leading to a neural code that is less taxing in a 
metabolic sense. Experimental evidence of sparse neural codes has been found in a variety 
of sensory modalities and animal species (see Barth & Poulet, 2012).
Figure 18.  Probability distribution of firing rates in 41 macaque temporal 
cortical neurons in response to visual stimuli. The dashed line shows the fit to 
an exponential (L-shaped) distribution. (Franco, Rolls, Aggelopoulos & Jerez,
2007)
Franco et al. (2007) studied the selectiveness of neural activity  to visual natural stimuli in 
macaque inferior temporal cortex. The probability distribution of firing rates formed by 
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adding the activity of 41 cortical neurons was found to fit an exponential distribution with 
low firing rates most  common. A small number of neurons were found to be highly active, 
displaying cumulative rates of 5–15 spikes in an interval of 100–300 ms from stimulus 
onset. For a given mean firing rate, the exponential distribution of firing rates on display 
here is consistent with both minimising energy  consumption and maximising the 
transmission rate of information.
Sparse coding of inputs has been demonstrated also in the olfactory system. Recording 
from a set of 177 individually sampled neurons, Poo & Isaacson (2009) report sparse 
representation of odors in rat primary olfactory  cortex. Neural responses to odors were 
found to be extremely weak, with increases in the average firing rate of active cells of only 
around 2 Hz and with only some 6% of neurons displaying activity of more than 10 Hz. 
Low average firing rates together with the scarcity  of highly active cells and the low 
activity fraction of the cell population indicate that odor representations are sparse in 
olfactory cortex.
Greene, Barrett, Sen & Houghton (2009) compared the receptive fields of neurons in the 
auditory forebrain of zebra finch to an artificial network constructed under the assumption 
of sparseness. As songbirds are known to be adept at distinguishing between a large 
number of different bird songs in their natural environment, recordings of 20 different 
zebra finch songs were selected as the auditory  stimuli to be presented. Recordings of 
activity in Field L neurons in the zebra finch forebrain show that they are adapted 
specifically to sparsely encode bird song stimuli, sharing similarities with activity 
displayed by the network generated specifically to exhibit sparseness.
In addition to sensory regions of the brain employing a sparse coding strategy  for incoming 
stimuli, the degree of sparseness of neural representations has been shown to vary 
according to contextual factors. Vinje & Gallant (2002) studied the effect of the non-
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classical receptive field (nCRF), an area surrounding the classical receptive field (CRF)16, 
on information transmission of neurons in primary visual cortex (V1) in macaque. The 
authors centered visual inputs containing natural scenes on the CRF of V1 neurons, 
varying stimulus size from one to four times the diameter of CRF. Stimulation of the nCRF 
was found to significantly increase both the rate of information transmission, the 
information in bits per spike, and the efficiency  of transmission measured as the fraction of 
available bandwidth used by  neurons to transmit information. The authors suggest that  the 
nCRF might tune V1 neurons to match the sparsely distributed informative components in 
visual natural scenes, resulting in a sparse and highly efficient neural code. Corroborating 
evidence for this view was later offered by  Haider, Krause, Duque, Yu, Touryan, Mazer & 
McCormick (2010), who replicated these results in both cat primary visual cortex and a 
simple computational model.
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16 The classical receptive field of a neuron is defined as the spatial region within which a stimulus presented 
in isolation can evoke a response in the neuron.
6   Discussion
The aim of this study has been to present evidence of the presence and, where possible, 
extent of biological optimisation in the central nervous system to do with the efficiency  of 
information processing. Especially in the case of wiring minimisation, structural 
optimisations are seen to reach levels close to their theoretical optima. Oftentimes the 
solutions shaped by natural selection in response to selective pressures were found to be 
conspicuously similar to those found in complex technological systems.
The notion of biological optimisation resulting from evolutionary adaptation has met with 
some scorn in the past (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Proponents of this approach have stood 
accused of trying to prove optimality in animals ex post facto and of constructing 
explanations on the go for the existence and justification of specific traits. While the 
process of evolutionary adaptation may never produce absolute optimality  in a system as 
complex as the human information processing apparatus, it has been shown to promote 
biological designs displaying a very high degree of efficiency. The discovery of design 
rules with general validity  in describing the evolution and function of nervous systems 
speaks loudly  to the legitimacy of such an approach and the explanatory power of design 
principles uncovered in this manner.
Examples of such parsimonious design rules were shown to feature widely in brain 
anatomy and physiology. The principle of wiring minimisation for one has far-reaching 
influence on the information processing architecture of the brain. Axon diameter, often 
accounting for the lion’s share of an individual neuron’s volume, is optimised to within 
touching distance of its theoretical minimum set by the buildup of noise in neuronal 
signalling (Faisal et al., 2005). The comparatively simple nervous system of the nematode 
worm C. elegans is particularly amenable to the study of wiring optimisation, exhibiting 
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close to optimal placement of neuronal components and hence minimisation of wiring 
(Pérez-Escudero et al., 2009).
Likewise, the drive for wiring optimisation can be seen to push for the separation of gray 
and white matter, for a wiring fraction of 3/5 in optimally wired gray matter and for the 
efficient layout of cortical regions. While the rule of “save wire” is certainly not the only 
factor promoting these design choices in brain architecture, it retains an almost  singular 
validity  in predicting features of neuroanatomy both across a range of species and of 
organisational levels. Given time and more comprehensive anatomical datasets, wiring 
optimisation may yet shed light on more specific rules of neural connectivity that could 
allow for the inference of neuronal function from anatomical data, illuminating the 
currently ambiguous relationship between brain anatomical and functional networks.
Just as wiring minimisation dictates that neuronal networks be designed so as to conserve 
biological cabling, so the efficient coding hypothesis first proposed more than five decades 
ago by Barlow (1961) suggests a similar economical principle at  work in neural coding and 
signalling. With natural scenes containing considerably redundant information, the sensory 
regions of the nervous system in particular are adapted to take advantage of those 
redundancies. Human cortex as a whole operates under an extreme paucity of energy, with 
only a few percent of neurons significantly active at any time.
The sparse coding of neural representations can be seen as a direct  corollary of the 
principle of efficient coding. Such a coding scheme combines representational and 
metabolic efficiency by recruiting a modest fraction of neurons to encode a single 
representation, skirting the high energetic costs inherent in fully distributed codes while 
still achieving a combinatorial capacity far beyond that of metabolically favourable local 
codes. As would be expected on the basis of these twin efficiencies, sparse neural codes 
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have been observed in a variety of sensory  modalities spanning a range of species (see 
Barth & Poulet, 2012).
While biological structures and man-made technological systems clearly differ in physical 
implementation, similarities can be discerned especially  at  higher levels of organisation. 
Small-world networks, for example, are found repeatedly at different organisational levels 
of brain structural and functional networks, just as they are elsewhere in natural, social, 
and technological domains. Local clusters typical of small-world networks are recombined 
at multiple levels of brain organisation to produce larger functional units, bringing to mind 
the modular design of many technological systems from Lego blocks to computer software 
modules.
Exploitation of the redundancy present  in sensory data and the efficient representation of 
relevant information through the use of energy-efficient sparse neural codes, too, share 
characteristics with technological solutions employed in the engineering of 
communications networks. Likewise, component-placement optimisation is a central 
concern in the design of electronic devices such as digital microchips just as it is in brain 
anatomy. In both domains an inferior arrangement of components causes excessive wire 
length and timing issues arising from signalling delays in long-range connections, and 
wastes energy as a result of unnecessarily long wires.
As for this thesis, the space available has, alas, a prevented a more comprehensive 
discussion of matters relating to efficient neural information processing. To give but a few 
examples of topics outside the scope of this study, it  is plausible that the unreliable and 
comparatively  slow behaviour of nerve cells has promoted the widespread parallel mode of 
information processing in the brain. Synaptic plasticity is thought to play  an important role 
in the functioning of both anatomical and functional cortical networks, with significant 
implications for neural signalling. Likewise, the synchronisation of neuronal activity 
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across cortical areas has been shown to affect the efficiency  of global information transfer 
in the brain. These themes, alongside numerous others, offer promising avenues for further 
research into the efficiency of biological information processing.
Contemporary experimental limitations still inhibit enquiry  on a number of fronts. 
Knowledge of wiring minimisation currently rests on a limited number of rather modest 
sets of anatomical figures. More comprehensive neuroanatomical datasets, perhaps 
eventually culminating in the holy grail of the human connectome, will in time permit ever 
more extensive analyses of wiring optimisation at  work. In the meantime there is hope for 
multi-resolution approaches offering a feasible midway point on the road towards the full 
connectome. Deeper knowledge of human neuroanatomy should also throw more light on 
the relationship between brain anatomical and functional connectivity. Likewise, the 
present evidence for stochastic resonance at work in the brain is for the most part  indirect, 
yet it is hoped that more advanced experimental techniques will in due course provide 
direct evidence of noise intrinsic to the brain playing a constructive role in neural 
signalling (McDonnell & Abbott, 2009).
The nature of neural coding presents another predicament to contemporary experimental 
research. For one, the sparsity  of neuronal activity  in the human cortex complicates the 
task of finding relevant spiking neurons in the first place. The highly selective firing 
patterns of neurons in higher-order sensory  cortical areas add a further level of difficulty, 
technological limitations to do with large-scale recordings of the activity  of individual 
nerve cells another. Novel techniques such as optical stimulation and recording of neurons, 
as well as longitudinal recordings, should in time permit a more detailed view of the nature 
of sparse neural representations.
Finally, some questions arise for future research. Global efficiency deriving from small-
world characteristics of brain networks is associated with individual differences in human 
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intellectual performance. That link is curiously  different for anatomical and functional 
networks: the average path length correlates positively with intelligence in both cases, yet 
the number of neuronal connections does so only for anatomical networks. The reasons for 
this are unclear at  present, but  this direct link between brain network efficiency and 
intellectual performance is a distinctly worthy topic of additional study.
Wiring minimisation operates at high efficiency even for optimisation problems of 
significant computational complexity. What is perhaps most remarkable about  this 
phenomenon is the apparent lack of either a collective or centralised mechanism guiding 
the process. With the availability  of ever larger anatomical datasets in particular, we may 
soon be able to assess whether or not wiring efficiency eventually  reaches a limit at some 
higher stage of complexity.
Behavioural requirements relating to information processing and neural coding are linked 
intricately  to neuroanatomy by biophysical constraints and provide a rich area of 
investigation. Limits to the human brain’s energy supply confine the brain’s “clock speed” 
to the millisecond range (Attwell & Gibb, 2005). This raises the question of whether faster 
processing would not confer selective value great enough to warrant its development, or 
whether perhaps a higher frequency of computation is simply  too costly given the sources 
of energy (food) available during human evolutionary history.
Perhaps the most  important question left unanswered is one concerning the possible future 
application of rules governing efficient brain design. Will knowledge of these seemingly 
universal principles eventually permit researchers to predict aspects of hitherto uncharted 
territory in the brain, say, in the domain of higher-order neural representations? We are not 
yet at that level – and we may never be – but conceivably the exposition of these principles 
of brain function may in time help to remove that “eternally nagging doubt” (Cherniak, 
69
1994) of whether we really understand how the brain works much better than a bunch of 
chimpanzees taking apart a radio.
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